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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ONE (1) PORSCHE 2 DOOR, I.D. NO.
911211026, TITLE NO. PP10026F,
BEARING K A N S A S LICENSE
PLATE NO. JOR 1652,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
13495

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
The Plaintiff-Appellant petitions this Honorable
Court for rehearing in the above entitled case pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 76(e), for the
reasons that (1) the Court has misapprehended the facts
and the law upon which it based its decision and (2) the
Court's opinion creates uncertainty in the law as to
whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(1) (e) (1953), is invalid or merely inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I.
PETITION FOR REHEARING IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT UNDER THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE.
This Court has previously recognized that to make
an application for a rehearing is a matter of right. Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913). Nevertheless, plaintiff-appellant recognizes that this right is
not absolute and that a petition for rehearing should not
be utilized to challenge areas of the Court's decision which
appellant merely disagrees with or considers unsatisfactory. Nor should the rehearing be used to reargue grounds
originally presented. Cummings v. Nielson, supra; Beaver
County v. Home Indemnity Co., 88 Utah 1, 52 P. 2d 435
(1935). The standard established by this Court in determining whether a petition for rehearing is proper was
expressed long ago in Brown v. Pichard, 4 Utah 292, 11
P. 512, reh. den., 4 Utah 292, 9 P. 573 (1886) :
"To justify a court in granting a rehearing
it must be convinced that there has been a failure to consider some material point in the case;
that there has been error in the conclusions heretofore arrived at; or that some matter has been
discovered unknown at the time of the hearing."
See also Cummings v. Nielson, supra, at 624, wherein
the Court stated the following:
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"When this c o u r t . . . has considered and decided all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked some
material fact or facts, or have overlooked some
statute or decision which may affect the result,
or that we have based the decision on some
wrong principle of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the result... If there are some reasons . . .
such as we have indicated above, or other good
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should be
promptly filed, and, if it is meritorious, its form
will in no case be scrutinized by this court."
(Emphasis added.)
The remaining points of this brief will adequately
show that this petition for rehearing is properly before
this court on the grounds that this court misconstrued or
misapprehended certain material facts of this case in
reaching its decision, certain law was likewise misconstrued, and finally there are adequate "other good reasons" for rehearing the case — namely, the Court's opinion has left uncertain whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-3713(1) (e) (1953), is invalid or merely inapplicable to the
narrow facts of this case.
POINT II.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT RAISES
AND LEAVES UNANSWERED THE IMPORTANT QUESTION CONCERNING THE
PRESENT VALIDITY OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-13(1) (e).
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There are three separate sections of the Court's
opinion which specifically discuss the possibility that the
statute may be invalid, yet, the Court never resolves this
critical issue.
The third paragraph of the opinion begins as follows:
"The section of the statute under which this
forfeiture was accomplished, Title 58-37-13(1)(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, either is invalid or inapplicable under the facts of this case
for the following reasons . . . " (Emphasis added.)
The first paragraph under Point III of the Court's
opinion reads in part as follows:
"The statute obviously can lead to the most
absurd results, — a reason this Court consistently has pointed up as a valid reason for invalidation of a statute, or a refusal to apply it under
particular facts making such application ridiculous . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The second paragraph under Point IV reads in part
as follows:
"The most that can be said for this statute's efficacy or practical worth, much less its
validity, was said in 1967, when the California
legislature repealed its legislation on forfeiture of
vehicles used in violation of narcotics laws . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
All three paragraphs raise the question of the Utah
statute's validity but the Court never reaches a conclusion
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in the matter. Unless this issue is resolved, law enforcement officers and prosecutors throughout Utah will be
reluctant to invoke the forfeiture statute even in cases
involving the most flagrant narcotics law violator.
Appellant submits that the Court, by questioning
the validity of Utah's forfeiture statute, apparently overlooked or misapprehended the case of Astol Calero-Toledo, et al. v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
U. S
,
94 S. Ot. 2080 (1974), wherein the United States Supreme Court recently declared the principle of forfeiture
constitutional. In that case, Puerto Rico's forfeiture statute (which is virtually identical to Utah's) was in question. See Puerto Rico Laws Ann. Tit. 24, Section 2512
(a) (4). The summary of the Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.
case contained in Utah's dissenting opinion in the instant case is a correct evaluation and reads as follows:
"That principle (forfeiture as a method of
law enforcement) was reaffirmed in a situation
greatly more exaggerated than the instant one.
After officers had discovered marijuana aboard,
the Yacht was seized and forfeited pursuant to
Puerto Rican statutes. The Supreme Court rejected the attack upon the procedure and the
statutes; and particularly rejected the contention of deprivation of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is noteworthy that our Utah statute is more
fair than the one under attack in the CaleroToledo case, in that under our statute the owner
is given the opportunity to show his innocence
and his interest will be protected."
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In view of the United States Supreme Court decision on this precise point, Utah's statute is valid on its
face and should be enforced and the present uncertainty
in the law created by the Court's opinion should be
remedied.
POINT III.
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-13 (1) (e) (1953), AS APPLIED TO THIS CASE LEADS TO AN UNUSUALLY HARSH RESULT AND CONSTITUTES AN ADDITIONAL FINE OR PENALTY IS BASED UPON A MISCONSTRUCTION OF BOTH FACT AND LAW.
Paragraph 1 of Point I of the Court's opinion reads
in pertinent part as follows:
"I. The section [Utah Code Ann. § 58-3713(1) (e) (1953) J, as applied to this case leads
to an unusually harsh result, constitutes an additional fine or penalty in connection with a
misdemeanor — that of possession of marijuana."
In support of this conclusion, the Court then states
that it is "conceded" that the basis of the charge was
that Mr. Price was in possession of "one ounce of marijuana." Appellant never made such a concession, and the
transcript in fact makes clear that Mr. Price was not
only in possession of more than one ounce of marijuana,
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but was also in possession of numerous pills which he
admitted were amphetamines:
TRANSCRIPT (Officer Peotol), Fage 1:
"I laid all the stuff containing contents of the
sack on the hood of the patrol car and asked him
(Price) if he could identify it and asked him if
the other two passengers knew what was in the
vehicle. And he stated no, that the marijuana
was his, and I asked him if he could identify
the pills and he said they are amphetamines."
Testimony on pages 1445 of fha transcript shows
that Officer Pectol had located a paper sack in the glove
box of Mr. Price's automobile, and that the sack contained two plastic bags of a substance which Mr. Price
admitted was marijuana and further contained a pill
box "containing several different colored pills" (admitted
by Price to be amphetamines). Reference is also made
to "a little leather type pouch with some more marijuana
and also a little pill capsule containing red pills" ^T 1*>.
The Court's notion that the automobile contained
only one ounce of marijuana is probably due to the fact
that the report of Mr. Bradley from the state toxicologic
says that he received thirty grams (approximately one
ounce) of plant material, canabis sativa (T. 12). However, Officer Pectol explains that he merely sent a "sample" of the total amount of drugs found in the automobile to the state laboratory:
TRANSCRIPT, p. 15 (Officer Pectol): "A.
we dumped all of the contents on the desk in
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the patrol office. Took a sample of marijuana
and placed it in a plastic bag and taped it up,
placed it inside of the yellow envelope. Wrote on
the sample 1, my case number and what the
sample was containing. Sealed that envelope,
taped it and initialed it, and we did this to each
of the different colored pills.
Q. That was sent in to the state toxicologist?
A. Yes."
From the above evidence, it is clear that the automobile contained far more illicit drugs than merely one
ounce of marijuana and that the one ounce figure reprsented a small "sample" of the total amount involved.
Thus, the Court's decision that the forfeiture statute as
applied to this case leads to an unusually harsh result
is predicated upon a misconstruction of the actual facts
of this case and for this reason alone should be reconsidered.
Secondly, the Court concluded in Pbinfcs I and II of
the opinion that the forfeiture statute is exclusively aimed
at deterring transportation of illicit drugs for distribution. The second paragraph under Point II reads as follows: •
"It appears obvious that the primary and sole
purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature were directed exclusively toward the
transportation of a controlled substance for distribution according to erstwhile law merchant
principles, and not for personal possession and
consumption." (Emphasis added.)
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Appellant submits that the legislature never intended the
forfeiture statute to apply exclusively to "transportation
for distribution" type cases alone. The wording of the
statute shows that the legislature also recognized the evils
of mere possession or concealment of illicit drugs, and
that vehicles could be used for these purposes as well.
The language of the statute reads as follows:
"(1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them:
*

*

*

(e) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or vessels used or intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in (1) (a) or (1)(b) of this section . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Had the legislature intended to exclude possession or
concealment from the forfeiture provision the statute
would have ended after the word "receipt." The use of
the word "or" just prior to the word "concealment" and
the placement of the commas in the statute are also
significant in that these grammatical tools further show
the legislature's intent to include under the act vehicles
used or intended for use either to transport or possess
or conceal illicit drugs. One illegal activity (transportation of drugs) clearly was not intended to work to the
exclusion of other violations of the act.
Appellant does not dispute that the transporting of
illegal drugs is a far more serious offense than possession.
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The entire Controlled Substances Act supports this concept. However, unlawful possession of a controlled substance is also a violaition of the act, and the legislature
clearly intended to include this class of offense under the
forfeiture statute.
Thus, it is submitted that the Court misconstrued
the forfeiture statute and the intent of the legislature in
reaching those conclusions expressed in Points I and II
of the Court's opinion.
Finally, the Court concluded that the forfeiture in
the instant case "constitutes an additional fine or penalty in connection with a misdemeanor — that of possession of marijuana." Appellant submits that while the
forfeiting of an automobile certainly does constitute an
additional financial hardship on the accused over and
above the punishment imposed for being convicted of
violating the Controlled Substances Act, the legislature
fully intended to authorize such forfeitures (even where
the value of the automobile exceeds the punishment for
the offense). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(8) (1953), provides as follows:
"Any penalty imposed for violation of this
section shall be in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law."
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court was
faced with a "possession" situation in the Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co. case, supra, where an expensive yacht was
seized, yet the forfeiture was upheld.
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Thus, the value of the conveyance or vehicle is irrelevant under Utah's forfeiture statute and should not have
been considered by the Court in its decision.
POINT IV.
THE COURT HAS ASSUMED A LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION BY MODIFYING A STATUTE OTHERWISE CLEAR ON ITS FACE.
The court's role is certainly to interpret the law.
However, it may not rewrite or disregard statutes that
are dear on their face. In Howard v. Howard, 333 P. 2d
417 (Oal. App. 1958), the court expressed the above
accepted statement of the law and stated:
"Any changes (in the statute) must come from
the legislature. The court may interpret but not
rewrite statutes."
When the statute, as in the present case, is clear on
its face the court errs by speculating that the legislature
meant something other than what it said. In Woodrmnsee v. Lowery, 334 P. 2d 991 (Cal. App. 1959), the
court cites approvingly 45 Cal. Jur. 2d p. 621 § 108 when
it states:
". . . it is equally true that where the meaning of
a statute is clear courts "must follow the language used and give to it its plain meaning,
whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expedhency, or policy of the act, even if it appears
probable that a different object was in the mind
of the legislature." (Emphasis added.)
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In the case of the statute in question, it is clear that
an automobile used to transfer or facilitate the transportation or possession of a controlled substance is subject to forfeiture. It is true, as the majority opinion points
out, that a thrust of the statute is to control transportaion of illicit drugs from one place to another. However,
an equally important thrust, as indicated by the clear
language of the statute, is to deter possession of illicit
drugs. The wisdom of the statute may be questionable
as well as the deterrent effect on the trafficking and possession of illicit drugs. However, the language is clear
and must be enforced by the courts. Other questions as
to the statute's propriety and wisdom should be deferred
to the legislature.
POINT V.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT DOES NOT
ESTABLISH ANY WORKABLE S T A N D ARDS OR GUIDELINES FOR FURTHER
APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FORFEITURE STATUTE.
In light of this decision by the Court, the state officials responsible for applying and enforcing the laws of
the State of Utah are presently in a quandry as to how
to apply the Utah forfeiture statute. The legislature had
drawn the line of enforcement of the statute to include
use of any conveyance for the possession of illicit drugs.
The Court now seems to say in a strict reading of its
holding that one in possession of only one ounce of a
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controlled substance whose car is valued at $10,000 cannot have his car forfeited. The Court indicates that
under those circumstances such a forfeiture is unconscionable. But what if the possessor of the controlled
substance has 2 ounces and his vehicle is worth only
$9,000.00? At what point will the court be saitisfied
that the forfeiture of such property is not an unconscionable penalty?
Appellant submits that the amount of the controlled
substance and the value of the automobile are both irrelevant factors under the present Utah forfieture statute.
No specified quantity of narcotics need be involved to
result in forfeiture. People v. One 1941 Buick Club Coupe,
165 P. 2d 44 (Cal. App. 1946), People v. One 1940 Buick
Sedan, 162 P. 2d 318 (Cal. App. 1945).
Nor does the statute require a purpose test before
a conveyance is to be forfeited. Tourism as a sole purpose for being in the state has no relevance to the misdemeanor of possession of an illicit drug.
The decision as it now stands leaves both law enforcement as well as future offender guessing in regard
to this statute. A clarification of this point is direly
needed especially by the state officials entrusted with
the enforcement and application of the narcotics laws.
POINT VI.
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE DO
NOT DEVOUR IT BUT PROVIDE A PRO-
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TECTION FOR INNOCENT PARTIES WHO
HAVE INTERESTS IN THE FORFEITED
PROPERTY.
The purpose of the statute is to act as a deterrent
to possession of illicit drugs. There is little use in deterring innocent parties from doing something they are
not doing. Therefore, in order to deal fairly with those
who hold security interests who did not know of the illegal
activity they were involved in, exceptions to the statute
were included. The statute requires that the party who
has the interest in the conveyance show that "he could
not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence
that the violation would take place in the use of the conveyance." The language of the statute would seem to
indicate that the burden to show that one did not know
of the illegal activity is upon the interest holder.
The exceptions to the statute do not give the offender
the right to drive freely through the state simply because he is not the owner, free and clear, of the vehicle.
It means that an innocent party's interest in the forfeited vehicle will be protected. Upon a showing "that in
the exercise of reasonable diligence" the holder of the
security interest could not have known that a violation
would take place, the interest will be recognized. In such
a case the court should enter a judgment of forfeiture
subject to the rights of the secured party. Upon presentation of his claim the party can then be satisfied out
of the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle. When the
amount due the conditional seller of an automobile is
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in excess of the value of the vehicle at the time of and
after its seizure, the court should order the vehicle released
to the lienholder instead of ordering a forfeiture of the vehicle subject to the legal owner's rights. People v. One
1957 Ford 2-Door Sedan, 325 P. 2d 676 (Cal. App. 1958).
The above procedure insures that the deterrent effect
of the statute is maintained in that the offender is no
longer in possession of the vehicle and has lost whatever
interest he may have had in it while the innocent security interest holder who comes forth with a showing of
his innocence is protected.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court, in reaching its decision, misapprehended certain facts and law surrounding the case, and
also because the opinion creates uncertainty in the law
as to whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(1) (e) (1953)
is invalid or merely inapplicable to the facts of the case,
it is urged that the case should be reheard, reconsidered
and the decision of September 18, 1974, be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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